
The Holocaust in Romania:

The Iasi Pogrom of

June 1941

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Background

In 1930, the Romanian Jewish community, one of the largest in Europe, numbered 756,930 members. Of these, about 150,000 lived in Northern Transylvania, which was occupied by Hungary in the summer of 1940; the remaining 600,000 Jews remained in territories ruled by Romania. In 1944, the Jews from Northern Transylvania shared the fate of the Hungarian Jews; only about 15,000 of them survived the deportations.

In 1923 a new Romanian constitution, adopted under the pressure of France, Great Britain and USA, had granted Romanian citizenship to almost all the ethnic minorities living in Romania. The rights granted to the Jews by the new constitution were challenged by the League of the National Christian Defence (later the National Christian Party) and by the Iron Guard, which, through a violent anti-semitic campaign, promised to implement 'numerus clausus' or 'numerus nullus'. In January and February 1938, King Carol II and Prime Minister Octavian Goga signed several decrees establishing 'the proclamation of the law of the blood' and the 'revision' of the granting of citizenship to the Jews. Soon afterwards the royal dictatorship of Carol II was established.

At the beginning of his dictatorship Carol II organised a severe repression against the Iron Guard. When, during the spring of 1940, it became clear to him that Nazi influence would not be opposed soon in European Europe, Carol released the imprisoned Iron Guard members and included some of their leaders in the government. During the summer of 1940, Romania was forced to give up Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, Northern Transylvania to Hungary and two small districts, Caliacra and Durostor, to Bulgaria. One month before General Antonescu took power in alliance with the Iron Guard, the Gurgu Government introduced severe anti-semitic legislation, openly inspired by the Nazi Nuremberg laws. This legislation remained in force after the fall of Carol and was further developed by the Antonescu-Sima and Antonescu governments.

The fate of the 600,000 Jews who remained under Romanian authority was determined by the changing attitudes of the fascist government; about 50 per cent of

them were killed during World War II. At the beginning, the Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina were either killed on the spot or deported to Transnistria (Soviet territory under Romanian administration between the Dniester and the Bug), where massacres of the local Jewish population were already in progress. At least half the Jews deported to Transnistria had perished by 1944.

In the Old Kingdom (Romania without Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Transylvania) anti-Jewish policies were somewhat less severe. Nevertheless, harsh discriminatory laws were imposed upon the Jews, and thousands of them were deported to Transnistria or to labour camps in Romania. Finally, massive pogroms (organised massacres of helpless people) took place in the Old Kingdom at Dorohoi, Bucharest and Iasi.

The Iasi pogrom is probably the best-known event in the history of the Romanian Holocaust. It was a major outbreak of violent anti-semitism, yet it was neither isolated nor fortuitous; rather it was part of a long series of mass murders committed by Romanian fascists. The Iasi pogrom was followed by the systematic deportation and extermination of the Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina and by the extermination of the Ukrainian Jews from Transnistria. Even before the Iasi pogrom two cases of mass murders of the Jews had taken place in Romania. From 29 June to 6 July 1940, when Romanian troops were retreating from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, territories occupied by the Soviet Union as a consequence of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact, at least 136 Jews, of whom 99 have been identified, were murdered. Many Jewish travellers and soldiers were thrown from moving trains. It was in Dorohoi that the bloodiest episode occurred. A unit of the Romanian army executed at least fifty Jewish civilians, among whom were some old people and very young children.

During this time Romania was under the royal dictatorship of Carol II. When at the end of January 1941, the six-month-old alliance between the Iron Guard and General Antonescu broke down, 120 Jews were butchered in Bucharest by members of the Iron Guard. Thousands of Jews were beaten up and thousands of Jewish homes and businesses were destroyed. The Iron Guard was crushed and outlawed and General Antonescu survived as leader of the country. His administration nevertheless remained staffed with many supporters of the Iron Guard and with former members of the extreme anti-semitic National Christian Party.

According to Matatias Carp, the Iasi pogrom was the natural outcome of decades of Romanian anti-semitism:

The Government's official antisemitic policy was inaugurated in 1867 and was implemented for half a century with implacable perseverance. By as early as 1913 this policy had imposed on the nation 196 restrictive antisemitic laws. . . . Then came the generation of 1922, with its disastrous views and actions, the violence and beatings at universities, the ransacking of shops and the desecration of synagogues and cemeteries. . . . Murders went unpunished. . . . [Then followed] the Goga–Cuza Government, the rebirth of the Government's antisemitic policy, the pogroms of June 1940, Antonescu and the Iron Guard regime, with its own brand of plunder and crimes, discriminatory legislation that raised theft to the level of state dogma and, finally, the so-called rebellion, with the sorrow and desolation it left in its

wake. All these are but stages on the endless road of persecution leading to extermination.¹

Indeed, the road to extermination was paved by decades of incitement during which the anti-semitic extreme right Romanian newspapers systematically presented the Jews as the sole source of the economic and social problems which confronted Romania. Systematically the Jews were presented as racially inferior and degenerate, as parasites, a biological danger, the invaders of the Romanian state. Alcoholism, prostitution, liberalism, modernism, socialism, abortion and women's liberation were all blamed on the Jews. But besides the slander, beyond all the anti-semitic propaganda, plans for 'solving' the 'Jewish problem' were presented by the Romanian fascists. Inspired by the Nazis, in 1938 Octavian Goga, the leader of the National Christian Party, proposed the deportation of all European Jews to Madagascar.² Another Romanian fascist, Alexandru Razmerita, criticised the suggestion of a Romanian priest who wanted to drown all the Romanian Jews in the Black Sea as non-practical because of lack of ships. He proposed instead a 'total elimination plan' of the Jewish population. He wanted to deprive the Jews of the right to appeal against their deportation from urban to rural areas for forced labour. Razmerita proposed rural concentration camps, each with a 'capacity' of twenty-five to forty inmates. He also proposed forced labour for children over ten years of age whose identity cards were supposed to contain instead of their last names only the name of their 'owner'.³ Theorists of the Iron Guard proposed eugenics laws and practices including sterilisation of the Jews.⁴

Anti-semitism as a cause for pogroms was especially true of Iasi. There existed in that city a powerful and long-standing tradition of anti-semitism, already well entrenched by the nineteenth century. Iasi, the capital of Moldavia, had given birth to A. C. Cuza's League of National Christian Defence, a violently anti-semitic organisation, as well as to a dissident splinter, C. Z. Codreanu's Legions of the Archangel Michael. These hatreds escalated when Romania entered World War II in June 1941. In the months preceding the beginning of hostilities against the Soviet Union, official Romanian anti-semitic propaganda increased. The Jews were subjected to stringent discriminatory measures and were consistently represented as an 'alien nation', 'Bolshevik agents' and a 'disruptive' and 'parasitic' element in Romanian society.

Preparation of the Pogrom

At the outbreak of war, Iasi, a city close to the Soviet frontier, had a population of

¹ Matatias Carp, *Cartea Neagra* (thereafter, Carp, *Cartea*), 3 vols (Bucharest: SOCEC & Co, 1946-8), 2. 11. Matatias Carp was the secretary of the Federation of Jewish Communities from Romania. He was given access to the folders of many Romanian war crimes trials. His 'Black Book' is a chronology of the Holocaust in Romania based on documents.

² Octavian Goga, *Paris Soir*, 10 Jan. 1938.

³ Alexandru Razmerita, *Cum sa ne aparam de evrei-Un plan de eliminare totala* (Turmu Severin: Minerva, 1938), 65-9.

⁴ Traian Herseni, 'Rasa si destin national', *Cuvintul*, 16 Jan. 1941, and Toma Petrescu, *Ni se pierde neamul - Actiunea jidanilor impotriva natiei romanesti* (Bucharest: Cugetarea, 1940), 124.

slightly more than 100,000 inhabitants, approximately 50,000 of whom were Jews. Even before 22 June 1941 a number of secret anti-semitic measures had been initiated in Romania. Thus, a few days before the outbreak of war, the Romanian director, General Ion Antonescu, sent an informal resolution to the Ministry of Propaganda demanding that 'all Judeo-Communist coffee shops in Moldavia be closed down, all kikes, Communist agents and sympathisers be identified by region ...'. Antonescu went on to emphasise: 'The Ministry of the Interior must know who they are, forbid them to travel, and be prepared to do with them whatever I shall order at the appropriate moment.'⁵

On 21 June 1941, the day before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, General Antonescu issued Ordinance No. 4147, directing that all Jews between the ages of eighteen and sixty years who resided in the villages between the Siret and Prut rivers be evacuated to the Tirgu Jiu camp in the south of Romania; the first trains were to leave on 21 June. Members of the families of those deported to Tirgu Jiu were evacuated to several towns. A time-limit of forty-eight hours was set for the execution of this operation. The order was counter-signed by Jack Popescu, Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior, and was forwarded to the Supreme Headquarters of the Romanian Army, the Inspector General of the Gendarmerie, the General Directorate of Police and all prefectures.⁶ During his trial in 1946, Ion Antonescu explained it thus: 'It is a military principle that the population near the front must be displaced.'⁷ He added that 'the Germans asked us to put all the Jews from Moldavia in ghettos'.⁸

Furthermore, a few days before the outbreak of war, at the meeting of gendarmerie units, General C. Z. Vasiliu, Inspector General of the Gendarmerie, had issued an order 'to clear the terrain', an order that entailed repressive measures against the Jews, including their deportation or liquidation.⁹ Some of the gendarmes who attended that meeting were in transit through Iasi during the pogrom and also participated in the attack on the city's Jewish population. They did so while waiting to take up their posts in Bessarabia and Bukovina, where they also committed numerous crimes.

It is evident that the existence of a sizeable Jewish population in the immediate vicinity of the front line concerned both the Romanian and the German military authorities. In his post-war testimony, Lieutenant-Colonel Traian Boreescu, chief of the chancellery of the Special Information Service (*Serviciul Special de Informatii*, or SSI) during the war, declared: 'I know for certain that Section II of Supreme Headquarters was involved with the problem of moving the Jewish population in

⁵ *Ibid.*, 2. 39. Order No. 62783, signed by Gen. I. Stefaea on 19 June 1941.

⁶ *Documents Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry During the Holocaust* (hereafter *Documents*), ed. Jean Ancel, 12 vols (New York: Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1986), 2. 468. Ancel is one of the leading authorities in the history of the Romanian Holocaust. Most of the documents originate from Israeli, Romanian and American archives.

⁷ *Procesul marii tradari nationale* (hereafter *Procesul*) (Bucharest: Eminescu, 1946), 53. *Procesul* is a collection of selected excerpts from the Antonescu trial.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

⁹ *Documents*, 6. 445.

Moldavia under the auspices of the respective statistics offices, with Colonel Gheorghe Petrescu in charge of this activity.¹⁰ Section II of the Supreme Headquarters of the Romanian Army closely monitored the activities of political parties and ethnic minorities. It consisted of three bureaux of statistics, located in Bucharest, Iasi and Cluj, and collaborated intimately with the Special Information Service.

From historical documents accessible so far, it appears that the responsibility for the organisation of the Iasi pogrom rested with the Special Information Service, with Section II of Supreme Headquarters and with the German secret services, primarily the *Abwehr*. In his post-war testimony, Traian Boreescu also stated:

As to the preparation and staging of the Iasi massacres, I suspect that they were the handiwork of the First Operative Echelon, since Eugen Cristescu [the chief of SSI] told me when he returned to Bucharest: 'The great deeds I accomplished in Moldavia, I accomplished in collaboration with Supreme Headquarters, Section II, namely with Colonel Radu Dinulescu and Lieutenant Colonel Gheorghe Petrescu.' I also know from [the SSI agent] Grigore Petrovici that Junius Lecca, Chief of the SSI network in Iasi, played an important part furnishing all the information on Jewish centres and congregations in Iasi.¹¹

On the other hand, Eugen Cristescu, in his written post-war deposition, tried to deny the fact that the SSI was implicated in the Iasi pogrom, maintaining that it was organised by the Gestapo, the SS Security Service (SD) and the *Gehime Feldpolizei* which, according to Cristescu, acted in Romania without the knowledge of the Romanian authorities (representatives of the SD and the Gestapo were indeed expelled from Romania because of their implication in the Iron Guard rebellion of January 1941).

Cristescu underscored the fact that the only secret service officially admitted to Romania was the *Abwehr*, whose liaison officer with the SSI was Major Hermann von Stransky. This German officer's name appears often in testimonies concerning the Iasi pogrom. Von Stransky, allegedly a nephew of the German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop, was married to a Romanian from Galati and spoke Romanian fluently, since he had lived in the country for many years. He worked closely with the SSI; for example, he informed the SSI of Horia Sima's unsuccessful attempts to cross the Romanian border illegally in January and February 1941.¹² It is possible that von Stransky was an agent not only of the *Abwehr* but also of other secret German services, though this has not been proved. Lieutenant-Colonel Ionescu-Micandru, head of SSI Section G (Germany), was the contact between von Stransky and the SSI.

Prior to the outbreak of war, to conform with others issued by the Prime Minister's Office and the Supreme Headquarters, the First Operative Echelon of the SSI was formed. Its official mission was to defend the front from sabotage, espionage and terrorism behind the lines. This echelon consisted of approximately 160 men.

¹⁰ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 48.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 2. 50.

¹² *Procesul*, 170; *Cartea*, 2. 41.

In June 1941 the First Operative Echelon left for Moldavia.¹³ As to its mission, Traian Borcescu gave the following description:

One of the secret and unofficial aims of the expedition of this Operative Echelon was to do away with the Moldavian Jews by deportation or extermination. For this purpose, SSI department head Florin Becescu-Georgescu, when leaving Bucharest, took along the files on Jews and Communists. From Iasi, the Echelon drove to Kishinev, where Jews were massacred. The same SSI teams that operated in Iasi operated in Kishinev as well. The Echelon went also to Tighina and Tiraspol, where it committed robberies, and to Odessa, where it participated in massacres.¹⁴

Splinter groups of the First Operative Echelon robbed and assassinated people in other zones of Bessarabia and Transnistria. In Moldavia, for several days prior to the Iasi pogrom, members of the echelon were active in Roman, where they reported to the head of Section II of Supreme Headquarters, as well as in Piatra Neamt and Iasi and its environs.

German-Romanian military operations against the Soviet Union began on 22 June 1941. On the same day, thousands of Jews from rural areas in northern Moldavia were transported by train and interned in camps at Tirgu Jiu, Craiova, Caracal and Turnu Severin. Constantin Chirilovici, the *Chester* (chief) of Police in Iasi, stated in a report that on the same date, 22 June, on Crucea Rosie Street, in front of No. 12, some twenty-five to thirty young members of the Iron Guard 'were instructed by two uniformed majors, a captain and a second lieutenant'.¹⁵

The first air-raid on Iasi by the Soviet Air Force took place on 24 June and hit the Ripa Galbena area and the railway station. It caused minor damage and left a few victims. The air raid produced anti-Jewish hysteria. Military personnel, the Iron Guard and members of the League of National Christian Defence spread the rumour that the entire Jewish population of Iasi was in the service of the Red Army and had provided ground signals for the Soviet Air Force. 'On 25 June, Iasi policemen scoured houses asking the gentile population to put the sign of the cross on their windows and over entrances.'¹⁶ A similar phenomenon had occurred one year earlier during the Dorohoi pogrom.

On 26 June at 11:00 am, the second Soviet bombing of Iasi took place. This time the results were devastating. The headquarters of the Fourteenth Division, the central telephone office and Saint Spiridon Hospital were hit; 600 people died, of whom 38 were Jews. According to other sources, there were 111 dead and hundreds

¹³ *Ibid.*, 2, 19.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2, 51-2.

¹⁵ Aurel Karetki and Maria Covaci, *Zile insignurate la Iasi* (hereafter Karetki and Covaci, *Zile*) (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1978), 50, citing Arhiva Ministeriului Apararii Nationale, fund IV Army, dossier 6262/1941, 195-200. *Zile insignurate la Iasi* is a revisionist book and the only one published between 1948 and 1989 which dealt extensively with the Holocaust in Romania. The Iron Guard was the Romanian fascist party; it was suppressed by Antonescu in January 1941. One of the majors was Gheorghe Balotescu, SSI chief in Iasi, and the other was probably Emil Tulbure, also a member of the SSI network in Iasi.

¹⁶ *Documents*, 6, 35. Braunstein testimony on the Iasi pogrom; Carp, *Cartea*, 2, 61, testimony of Colonel N. Lupu, commander of the Iasi garrison.

of wounded.¹⁷ As a result of this bombing, anti-Jewish hysteria increased. Romanian military reports mentioned finding some Iasi Jews among the crews of the shot-down Soviet airplanes. There was also talk of the presence in town of some Soviet saboteur paratroopers.

At that time the Romanian units in Iasi consisted of soldiers of the Fourteenth Division, a company of the Thirteenth Regiment of 100 men, and 300 men from the battalion of gendarmes.¹⁸ There were also 450 local policemen and 330 policemen from around the country who were eventually to take up their posts in Bessarabia and Bukovina. Also present were German troops from the Thirtieth Army Corps, the 198th Division, as well as SS troops and members of the Todt organisation.¹⁹

On 20 June Hery Staerman (of 7 Ipsilante Street), leader of a forced labour camp of 110 young Jews, received an order from the Paramilitary Preparation Inspectorate of Iasi to go to the Pacurari Jewish Cemetery hurriedly to dig two graves of the sizes indicated by the Town Hall technical department. The graves were ready on 26 June.²⁰

In his testimony one of the survivors named Braunstein described the graves as being either 30 or 15 metres in length, two metres wide and two metres deep. He also made clear that the order to dig the graves was issued two weeks before the pogrom.²¹

Also on 26 June 1941, Major von Stransky and SSI Colonel Ionescu Micandru arrived at the headquarters of the Fourteenth Division, where they remained several hours before leaving for Holboca.²² After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Constantin M. Radulescu Sita of SSI stated that on the occasion of Eugen Cristescu's birthday, 24 December 1942, he was at a table at SSI headquarters in Bucharest and overheard Ionescu Micandru tell von Stransky: 'Don't worry, we will put an end to the Jewish problem [in Bucharest] just as we did in Iasi; when some of us got tired, others took our place. Isn't that so, Sandu?'²³

Thursday, 26 June, was also significant because on that day the Iasi pogrom claimed its first victims. The Thirtieth Dorobanti Regiment, in its report to the Fourteenth Division, stated that Iosub Cojocaru, Leon Schachter and Herscu Wolf, residing at 27b Vasile Lupu Street, signalled with rockets to the Soviet Air Force the location of buildings occupied by the Romanian Army. Escorted under guard to the headquarters first of the regiment and then of the division, the accused were searched by two Romanian officers, who set them free. Since the Copou hill, where the divisional headquarters was located, was a restricted area to Jews, the three

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2, 22, 95; Karetki and Covaci, *Zile*, 45, citing Arhiva Ministeriului Apararii Nationale (AMAN), fund 'Comandament IV teritorial', dossier 1349/1941, 232.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 45-6 citing Arhiva Ministeriului Afacerilor Interne (AMAI), 29, 9-10.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Marius Mirca, *Pogromul de la Iasi* (hereafter Mirca *Pogromul*) (Bucharest: Glob, 1945), 5.

²¹ *Documents*, 6, 43.

²² *Ibid.*, 6, 376-7; and Carp, *Cartea*, 2, 58.

²³ *Documents*, 6, 377; and Carp, *Cartea*, 2, 53. The person referred to as 'Sandu' was Major von Stransky.

prisoners were escorted by Sergeant Mircea Manoliu, a member of the Iron Guard; he took them to the garrison's target practice range, where he shot them. Schachter managed to escape; Herscu Wolf, though badly wounded, fainted but survived; Cojocaru died.²⁴

On the same day, five unidentified Jews were sent to mark with lime the location of unexploded bombs in the courtyard of the headquarters of the Thirteenth Dorobanti Regiment. Although they had been instructed to perform this task by Police Inspector Nicolae Craciun, the five Jews were accused of espionage and detained at regimental headquarters.²⁵

On the afternoon of 26 June, the leaders of the Jewish community of Iasi were ordered to present themselves at the *Chestura*, the central headquarters of the Iasi police, where they were told that the Jews of Iasi were guilty of collaborating with 'downed Jewish Soviet pilots'. The *Chestor* of Iasi, Lieutenant-Colonel Chirilovici, ordered that all binoculars, flashlights and cameras be handed in within 48 hours.²⁶ At 4.00 pm the following officials gathered at the headquarters of the Iasi prefecture: the county prefect, Colonel Dumitru Captaru; the garrison commander, Colonel Constantin Lupu; the *Chestor*, Lieutenant-Colonel Constantin Chirilovici; Security Inspectors Giosanu and Cosma; the Chief Public Prosecutor; and the municipal physician. They decided to add a detachment of gendarmes to each police station and ordered house-to-house searches to catch saboteurs and spies.²⁷ As a result, that very evening between the hours of 5.00 and 9.00, many Jewish homes were raided and searched. Forty teams composed of 140 policemen and 677 gendarmes, all of them Romanian, participated in this operation: 317 Jews were picked up and taken to the *Chestura*; of these, 207 were detained because they owned flashlights or objects made of red cloth.²⁸

On Friday, 27 June 1941, isolated shots were heard, and immediately after 11 am, Colonel Lupu, the garrison commander, telephoned *Chestor* Constantin Chirilovici, and told him:

I was informed that a group of Iron Guards have gathered in a pavilion in the Pacurari district Jewish Cemetery [near the graves that had been dug earlier]. They were singing legionnaire songs and alarming the population. I immediately ordered a platoon of soldiers into trucks, and we drove to the scene of the disturbance where I found some 30 or 40 Iron Guards, all of them armed. By the time we arrived, they were beginning to disperse. In the pavilion where they had gathered I found two cases of weapons. Two of them approached me and told me that they had been sent by Supreme Headquarters and the SSI to arm the Iron Guards, who were then supposed to infiltrate behind the enemy front. I asked these two why they had not reported this plan to us too, then I withdrew my troops to military quarters. Approximately one hour later, the two persons with whom I had spoken earlier, presented themselves to me dressed in majors' uniforms and asked my forgiveness, saying that they had tried to implement a secret plan of operation, but that it had not come off. I

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 2. 22-3, and *Documents*, 6. 368.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6. 369.

²⁶ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 66.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 2. 25, 61; *Documents*, 6. 369.

²⁸ Karecki and Covaci, *Zile*, 57, citing AMAN, fund '14th Infantry Division', dossier 117, file 95.

searched these two officers, who showed me their orders from Supreme Headquarters. I reported this case to the commander of the Third Army.²⁹

The two majors were SSI officers Gheorghe Balotescu and Emil Tulbure, who had organised a similar operation in Iasi on 22 June 1941, but at that time they had been in uniform. The explanation they gave, that they intended to place Iron Guards behind enemy lines, was somewhat curious to say the least, in view of the extremely noisy manner in which these so-called 'agents' were being prepared for duty. Also curious was the behaviour of Colonel Lupu, who allowed armed Iron Guards, at that time considered a danger to the security of the country, to disperse, although he was accompanied by at least two truckloads of soldiers.

On the evening of 27 June in the Nicolina district, Dr Marcu Kaufman's father was fatally shot in the back by an artillery sergeant, a member of a Romanian unit.³⁰ That same evening five Jewish men, detained at the Thirteenth Dorobanti Regiment and accused of espionage, were entrusted to the same Mircea Manoliu, to be escorted for interrogation to the headquarters of the Fourteenth Division. Instead of taking them to their destination as ordered, Mircea Manoliu, accompanied by Corporal Nicolau (or Nicolae), stopped at the target range where they shot all five, something that Manoliu had done there to other Jews earlier. The five corpses were found the following day, and the county prefect reported the incident to the commander of the Fourteenth Division, mentioning not five but six victims.³¹

The Pogrom Unfolds

A combination of long-time anti-semitic traditions, terror spread by the military operations, official anti-semitic propaganda and the manipulations organised by SSI made the Jewish population of Iasi an easy target for the pogromists. On the morning of Saturday, 28 June 1941, a group of thirty soldiers from the Thirteenth Dorobanti Regiment and from Artillery Regiment 24, led by Sergeant Mircea Manoliu, robbed and abused several Jews on the pretext that they were searching for a radio transmitting station. That same morning German soldiers also participated for the first time during the Iasi pogrom in the mistreatment of Jews. Incidents occurred in the Tatarasi District on Rachi Street and in the Abator (slaughterhouse) District on Aurel Vlaicu and Vasile Lupu streets. The *Chestor* arrived at the scene, as did the garrison commander, the Chief Public Prosecutor of Iasi, the Pretor of the Fourteenth Division and a platoon of gendarmes. Mircea Manoliu was arrested but shortly thereafter released by the Pretor of the Fourteenth Division, Major Nicolae Scriban.³²

At the same time, printed posters began to appear on walls in Iasi openly calling for the massacre of Jews: 'On Saturday, 28 June, I saw posters glued to the walls of houses, calling for a pogrom. For instance: "Romanians! Each kike killed is a dead

²⁹ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 25, 61; *Documents*, 6. 369.

³⁰ Mirca, *Pogromul*, 9.

³¹ *Documents*, 6. 369, 2. 433; Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 25, 69.

³² *Documents*, 6. 369-70, 2. 433; Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 26.

Communist. The time for revenge is now!"³³ Members of the civilian population then joined those in uniform. Moreover, on the evening of 28 June, Police Commander Gheorghe Leahu ordered Iasi policemen 'not to get involved in whatever the army may do in town, whether good or evil'.³⁴

At 9:00 pm on 28 June, an aeroplane, probably German, fired a signal rocket; accounts differ as to whether it was blue or red. Immediately afterwards, volleys of diverse calibres of firearms were heard throughout the city. They created a high state of panic among the ranks of the military who at the time were passing through Iasi on their way to the front. There was shooting in the districts of Pacurari, Toma Cosma and Sararie, as well as in Carol, Lascar, Catargiu and Lapusneanu streets. The military units passing through the city fanned out in fighting positions and returned the fire.³⁵ In his report to Ion Antonescu, dated 2 July 1941, General Leoveanu, the Director General of Police entrusted with the inquiry into the Iasi events, stated that no dead or wounded were found among either German or Romanian troops. What they did find, however, were shells from duelling pistols.³⁶

A rumour spread that Soviet paratroopers were active throughout the city. As a result, throughout the night groups of soldiers, gendarmes and army recruits, Romanian as well as German, accompanied by civilians, plundered and murdered Jews:

On the night of 28 June 1941, a group of young gentiles led by the coachman Lepioskin, and accompanied by soldiers, went into the outskirts of the Abaror neighbourhood and began plundering and killing. Also that night, an air-raid alarm sounded at 9:00 pm and lasted until 8:00 am next day. A group of soldiers and paramilitary entered the building at 3 Stefan cel Mare Street, where they shot and killed Iosif Smilovici, owner of the knitwear store Minca. Another group entered the courtyard of the Binder Hotel in Lapusneanu Street and, with the pretext that they had found a machine-gun in the attic, arrested Blau, the manager of the hotel, his wife, his daughter, a sister-in-law, and his mother-in-law. After a summary trial, they were executed: machine-gunned in front of the building of the Ferdinand Foundation. Blau was a cinematographer, well known as a man of peace, incapable of committing a crime. The truth, as it was later learned, was that the machine-gun had been placed in the hotel attic by some Iron Guard soldiers who were guarding Tax Collection Office No. 1, located in the same building. In fact, these soldiers had robbed Blau earlier in the evening.³⁷

A report sent at 9:30 am on 29 June from the regional police to police headquarters in Bucharest demonstrates the attitude of the Romanian authorities:

In Iasi, on the night of 28-29, at 10:30 pm, Communist Jews and a few Romanian Communists opened heavy machine-gun fire. Their aim was twofold: to provoke panic among the population and to stop the movement of marching troops. The police, the Romanian and German armies, were immediately alerted and proceeded to search houses.³⁸

³³ *Ibid.*, 2. 89, statement of the witness Israel Schreier; *Documents*, 6. 370, indictment in the trial of war criminals, dossier 3266/1947.

³⁴ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 26, 67.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2. 26.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2. 116.

³⁷ *Documents*, 6. 35, Braunstein testimony.

³⁸ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 83, Report No. 23469 from regional Police Inspector E. Giosanu.

A report of 29 June from the Iasi regional police to police headquarters in Bucharest specified that shortly after 10:00 pm on 28 June, Colonel N. Lupu, Garrison Commander, Colonel Barozi, Pretor of the Third Army, Colonel Gheorghe Badescu, Inspector of the Gendarmes, Major Scriban, Pretor of the Fourteenth Division, and Police Inspector E. Giosanu arrived at the *Chestura* to evaluate the situation and sent their report to the commander of the Fourteenth Division. Additional police were immediately sent to reinforce the gendarmes and the public guards (the urban patrols) who had been dispatched to the scenes of disturbance earlier in the day.³⁹ At this meeting it was decided that 'suspects' would be rounded up the following day and taken to the *Chestura*.

On the morning of 29 June, a Sunday, shots were heard again. This time, Jews were direct targets. The surviving Jews were formed into columns and marched from Tatarasi, Pacurari, Sararie and Nicolina streets to the *Chestura*. Some columns made temporary stops at the National High School, the headquarters of the Thirteenth Dorobanti Regiment, the Wachtel School or the Regional Inspectorate of Security, but the ultimate destination was nevertheless the *Chestura*. Most of the prisoners were men, but among them were also some women with children. Some were dressed; others were in their nightclothes. Many had been beaten and had bruises and open wounds. Most of them were forced to march in step with their arms raised. Civilian onlookers, as well as soldiers and gendarmes, Romanian and German, spat at them and hit them with stones and broken pieces of glass, clubs, crowbars and rifle butts. Prisoners unable to walk because of the blows they had suffered or because of physical disabilities were shot, so that the streets were strewn with corpses.⁴⁰

In the Pacurari section, Dr Piker was shot in front of his wife. Also murdered were the following manufacturers: Fall, his son and his son-in-law; Holzman and his only son, a high school student; Schmeer with two sons; and the engineer Pulferman and his son-in-law. In the Bratianu section, the shopkeeper Milu Goodner was killed in front of his wife; also killed were Dr H. Solomonovici, who was visiting his daughter on Bratianu Street, and Dr Manole Solomon. On Stefan cel Mare Street, an eight-year-old girl, Tauba Grunberg, was shot. She was found disembowelled in front of the Hirschenson store. On the same street, at the corner of Lozonski Street, the family of the publican Samuel Leibovici was gunned down. The father, daughter and son died instantly; the mother, fatally wounded, died at the Gheletre Hospital. The hotel-owner Herman Rotman was found shot on University Street. Plunder was the motive for some of these attacks. The actor Vinovschi, an accomplice in the murder of the Leibovici family, immediately took over their property.⁴¹ At 2 Xenopol Street, the merchant Jean Olivenbaum and the Marcu-soln family of three were shot and killed. German soldiers propped up Olivenbaum's corpse on a machine-gun emplacement and took a picture. This photograph, published in the German magazine *Der Adler*, was supposed to prove that

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2. 70, 108; *Documents*, 6. 370 Report No. 23621.

⁴⁰ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 27-8; *Documents*, 6. 371.

⁴¹ *Documents*, 6. 36-7, 384, Braunstein testimony, Micu, *Progonul*, 31-3.

Jews were shooting at the German army. The lawyer Altein met with the same fate. On Stroescu Street, at the corner of Vovidenie Street, some German soldiers asked people in a shelter whether there were any Jews among them. When told that there were none, they left; but a baptised Jew, the lawyer Cecilia Reiter, denounced the paediatrician Cozac Averbuch. The Germans returned to the shelter and shot him. Moscovici, who was eighty years old, was shot at 20 Saint Andrei Street by Romanian soldiers. At the same time, his son was shot on Saint Lazar Street.⁴²

Often, when Jews were led off to the *Chestira*, they were robbed:

The baker Herscu Marcu (27 Zugiavi Street) was picked up early in the morning by a Gypsy from the slums armed with a club. The Jew took his wife and two children with him. He was not allowed to lock up his house. In his absence he was robbed of all his possessions. Avram Ilii, a 24-year-old office clerk, and his family were dragged out of their home and badly beaten. Racovita, a medical examiner at the Saint Spiridon Hospital morgue, assaulted Ilii's father. His mother was dragged into the street by her hair. All three were taken to the *Chestira*. In their absence, their house was plundered of everything. Colonel Mihail Niculescu-Coca was billeted in Solomon Sternberg's house (24 Pacurari Street). While Sternberg and his family were being transported to the *Chestira*, the colonel's orderly stole as much as he could. When the Sternbergs returned home, they complained to the colonel that they had been beaten. The colonel, their guest, slammed the door in their faces.⁴³

Civilians frequently joined the police and the military in dragging Jews out of their homes. For instance, a group of Jews, among them Hery Staerman of 7 Ipsilante Street, were taken from their homes by several Romanian railway employees, who lived in the same neighbourhood. They had the same calibre of guns as the guards whom they accompanied.⁴⁴ Some Jews were killed on the spot: Leon Davidovici (8 Pinzaritei Street) and his father were taken out of their home by Roman, a member of the public guards, husband of the cashier of the Trianon, who lived across the street. The guard was accompanied by a German officer. At the gates of their house, the father was hit on the head with a crowbar. Within seconds he was dead in his son's arms.⁴⁵

Many more eyewitness accounts of the assassination of Jews in the streets of Iasi were collected by the Bucharest prosecutor. The notorious Iron Guard Stefan Scobai fatally shot Ilic Bursin and Mihail Herman on Bratianu Street. Dumitru Cercel, a policeman attached to the sixth precinct of the Iasi police, killed four Jews: Dumitru Constantinescu, a follower of Cuza, bludgeoned to death several Jews; and public guard Gheorghe Grossu murdered one Jew. Other killers, whose victims died immediately or shortly thereafter from severe beatings or stab wounds, included the wood sculptor Stefan Scobai; the public guards Leon Cristiniu, Constantin Blindut, Rudolf Lubas, Mihai Anitulesci and Ion Ciubotaru; the merchant Dumitru Dadirlat and the clerk Nicolae Russu; the Iron Guards Dumitru Andronic, Ioan Laur and Dumitru Dumitriu; the pedlar Vasile Velescu; the student Aurel Gramatiuc; and several other civilians named Gheorghe Tanase, Nicolae

Lupu, Ion Manastireanu, Ion Bocancea, Gheorghe Grossu and Dumitru Ciubotaru.⁴⁶

During their forced marches to the *Chestira*, the columns of Jews often came upon corpses. Thus a column that left the Fifth Police Precinct at 5:00 pm under an escort led by the public guard Angelescu saw the corpse of an old man on Apeduct Street. A little further they came across the body of a child, offspring of the tinker Suchar. On Cuza Voda Street, by the Chamber of Commerce and in front of the store Ghemul Verde, the prisoners saw two piles of corpses, among them women and children. On Vasile Alecsandri Street, a German soldier shot an old man in the back of the head. The bodies of Smil Idelovici and Moise Leb, father-in-law and son-in-law, lay by the entrance to the *Chestira*.

Another group of Jews formed a column on Smirdan Street and were led away by soldiers and public guards. On their way they saw the body of an old Jew who had pinned to him a note from the *Chestira* stating that he was free; a German soldier had shot him. In Sirota Grossu's dental office, the publican Schneider, a boy, an old man and several others were found on the floor, shot dead. More corpses of Jews were stacked in front of the Jelea pharmacy, at the corner of Sararie.⁴⁷

On occasion gentiles did come to the rescue of Jews. Isodor Sulemer was caught in a roundup at 42 Stefan cel Mare Street. Two Romanian officers happened to be passing by and forced the escorts to free the Jews.⁴⁸ Sometimes Jews escaped the forced march to the *Chestira* by purchasing the goodwill of the men involved in the raid. For example, several Romanian military men and a few civilian slum-dwellers entered Mendel Sacagiu's home at 55 Smirdan Street. They left after the military men each received 1,000 lei and the civilians 50 lei.⁴⁹

The outcome of these encounters was, however, not always so favourable. On the same Smirdan Street, the mob was led by shoe-makers Ioan Munteanu, Cucu and Turila, all living on the same street. The first two carried sticks and Turila was armed with a shovel. They rounded up some eighteen Jews, among them Herscu Waldman. The civilians snarled: 'To the slaughterhouse.... You shot eleven Germans. Just you wait, we'll show you.' They forced the Jews to walk with their arms above their heads and hit with bayonets those who did not keep their arms high enough. They marched for some three kilometres, from Smirdan Street to Vasile Lupu, Oancea and Abator streets, as far as the *Aviatia*. On the way neighbours spat at them and hit them, saying: 'Look, they caught last night's bandits. They're all Jews, didn't I tell you?' When they reached the *Aviatia* field, the mob opened fire with machine-guns. Eleven were killed and the rest fled to the *Eternitatea* cemetery. They were not pursued.⁵⁰

Other massacres were avoided at the last moment. Thus a convoy of 800 to 1,000

⁴² Documents, 6, 40-1, Braunstein testimony.

⁴³ Mirca, *Progonul*, 15.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Documents, 6, 364-419, Office of the Prosecutor, Bucharest, War Criminals Section, Dossier No. 5260/1947, esp. 384-5, 387-8, 390, 392-8.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 6, 20-2, 24.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 6, 28-9.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 6, 24.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 6, 19.

Jews, including women and children, among them the carpenter Iosub Weissman (142 Socola Street), David Ilic Meier (5 Calusei Street) and the civil servant Ilic Moritz (113 Socola Street), were made to lie face down on the banks of the Bahlu River beside several large pits. They were beaten by railway employees Petru Gadea and Cassian Cazacu; the carter Costache Panait; Costica Damian; and Petrescu, a maker of brandy stills. One of the prisoners, a rabbi from Buhusi, was drowned. The chauffeur of *Chestor* Chirilovici witnessed the scene and alerted his boss. Chirilovici arrived immediately on the scene, accompanied by another officer. He saw a sergeant about to fire his machine-gun at the Jews and ordered him to free them.⁵¹

Sometimes, those who attempted to defend Jews were killed with them. This was the case with engineer Naum, a gentle, brother-in-law of Chief Public Prosecutor Casian. Naum, a former Assistant Professor of Medical Chemistry at the Iasi Institute of Hygiene, well known in select circles as an eloquent defender of liberal views, attempted to save a Jew on Pacurari Street, outside the Ferdinand Foundation. The Romanian officer who was about to kill the Jew said to Naum, 'You dog, die with the kike you are defending', and shot him point-blank. The priest Razmerita was shot on Sararie Street while attempting to save several Jews, dying with the victims he tried to protect. While trying to defend some Jews on Zugravilor Street, outside *Rampa*, the lathe operator Ioan Gheorghiu was killed by railway workers.⁵²

Some potential tragedies were, however, averted. For instance, although a band of Romanian soldiers threatened to shoot him, Grigore Porfir, manager of the *Dacia* mill, was able to rescue about 100 Jewish workers who were inside the mill.⁵³ Similarly, the pharmacist Becanu risked his own life to save dozens of Jews.⁵⁴ Police Inspector Suvai freed 350 Jews who had been rounded up and whom he was supposed to escort to the *Chestira*. Police Inspector Mircescu and the public guard Sava saved many Jews either by advising them to stay indoors or by keeping them under arrest but not sending them to the *Chestira*.⁵⁵

Thousands of Jews were herded into the courtyard of the Iasi *Chestira*. A report provided details:

So far, 1,000 people have been arrested, almost all Jews. By order of the General Commander, this procedure will be repeated daily. We do not have details, as the operation is in progress. These operations are conducted under the supervision of the Chief Army Prefect, of the Inspector of Gendarmes, and of the Deputy *Chestor* of the Iasi Police, Lieutenant-Colonel Chirilovici.⁵⁶

Another report, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Chirilovici and addressed to the Iasi Inspectorate of Police and Security, stated that about 1,800 women, children, and men were held in the *Chestira* courtyard at 9.00 am.⁵⁷ In a report to the Ministry of

the Interior, the county prefect, Colonel Dumitru Captaru, stated that by 1.00 pm there were 'about 3,500 suspects, most of them Jews', in the *Chestira* courtyard.⁵⁸ In yet another report, addressed to the Minister of the Interior, Lieutenant-Colonel Chirilovici accounted for 1,000 Jewish prisoners at 9.00 am and 5,000 at nightfall.⁵⁹ The *Chestor* stated that at noon there were 3,500 Jews in the *Chestira* courtyard.⁶⁰ General Stavrescu, commander of the Fourteenth Division, made several appearances in the *Chestira* courtyard.

At 11.00 am, after Stavrescu left, a committee consisting of Police Inspectors Dumitru Iancu and Titus Rahoveanu performed a selection among the prisoners. Some were set free because their identity cards were in order or as a gesture of goodwill. They freed women, children and doctors. All of those released received slips of paper with the inscription *free* and the stamp of the prefecture. Some of those freed were, however, shot in the street as they walked back to their homes. Others were brought back to the *Chestira* after a few hours despite their stamped pieces of paper. The number of those released varied between 200 and 2,000, depending on the source of information. While some Jews were leaving the *Chestira*, more columns continued to arrive. Many Jews went there on their own initiative in order to get a note stamped *free*.

At about noon SS soldiers and members of the Todt organisation formed a living corridor through which columns of Jews had to pass in order to enter the *Chestira* courtyard. The Germans were joined by Romanian gendarmes, policemen and civilians, among them Gheorghe Bocancea and Ghita Iosub.⁶¹ Armed with iron crowbars and wooden cudgels, they beat their victims, usually hitting them on the head. Among those killed in this manner were Lucian Berman, Iancu Soicat (22 Mirzescu Street), his nineteen-year-old son Sami and the boy's seventy-five-year-old grandfather, Haim Segal.⁶²

At about 1.30 pm, German soldiers and Romanian gendarmes and soldiers surrounded the *Chestira* and an area close by, including Vasile Alecsandri, Cuza Voca and Bratianu streets, and Piata Unirii. According to some witnesses, the Romanian authorities lost control of the situation. At about 2.00 pm, the German and Romanian soldiers and policemen began to fire directly into the crowd; they were joined by some civilians, among them Dumitru Dumitriu, who owned a machine workshop near the *Chestira*.⁶³ They used machine-guns, automatic weapons or rifles. Crazy with terror, some Jews tore down the fence of the *Chestira* and tried to take refuge near the Sidoli Cinema and in the surrounding streets and houses. These, too, were mown down without mercy. In addition, the killers stripped the corpses of watches and fountain pens. It was an apocalyptic scene:

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⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 6, 29–30.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 6, 41.

⁵³ *Minimum*, no. 18, (Tel Aviv, 1988): 78, testimony of Leizer Ghidale.

⁵⁴ Moses Rosen, 'Uitare? Iertare? Reabilitare?', *Revista Culturală Mozaic* (Bucharest, 15 Oct. 1986):

⁵⁵ Karetki and Covaci, *Zile*, 80, citing AMAI, Dossier 108233, Vol. 1, pt 2, 457; Carp, *Cartea*, 2.

⁵⁶ testimony of Jacob Nahumovici.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 2, 83, Report No. 23469, telephoned 29 June 1940, 9.30 am.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2, 85.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2, 12.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 2, 109.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2, 112.

⁶¹ Mircu, *Pogromul*, 37; *Documents*, 6, 388, 396.

⁶² Mircu, *Pogromul*, 38; *Documents*, 6, 36.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 6, 387.

I saw a multitude of people rushing in confusion towards the Zafitropol garage, near the *Chestina*, in a hail of machine-gun fire. Two bullets grazed me as I fell to the pavement. I lay in this state for several hours, and saw with my own eyes people die in front of me, some of whom I knew, others who were strangers. For instance a wounded Jewish veteran of the 1916–1918 campaign, with his medals for 'Courage and Faith' still pinned to him, in his hands papers that entitled him to rights (as a Romanian citizen), his chest torn open by bullets, died like a dog in a rubbish tip. Then there was young Segal, son of a leather dresser (who also died, together with his two other sons), who kept moaning as he was dying: 'Mother, father, where are you? Give me water, I'm thirsty.' But nobody could help him. The soldiers passing by saw Jews in their agony and pierced them with their bayonets to end their misery.⁶⁴

The massacre continued intermittently until 6.00 pm, with a pause for General Stavrescu's return at 4.30.

It is very difficult to establish the number of victims of the *Chestina* massacre. According to two sources, there were approximately 1,000 victims. In his statement, Georgehe Leahu, also a *Chestor* of Iasi, declared that when the massacre began there were 3,500 Jews in the *Chestina* courtyard and that after the massacre some 2,500 Jews were lined up in columns and led to the railway station.⁶⁵ Marius Mircu makes reference to 900 dead (500 in the *Chestina* courtyard and another 400 at the Sidoli cinema).⁶⁶ Two hundred and fifty-four bodies were buried in communal graves in the Jewish cemetery. Four trucks and twenty-four carts transported the corpses. It took two whole days to move them. Some corpses were dropped off at the Copou district garbage dump. They had been stripped. Many wounded and dying were buried with the corpses, having been stacked in piles before being carted away.⁶⁷ Even an official communiqué issued to the press later acknowledged that 500 Jews died, and went on to explain:

The Soviets are trying in every possible way to inspire sabotage, disorder and aggression behind the front. To this end they parachute spies and terrorists from airplanes. Once on land, the enemies contact local agents in Romania and Judeo-Communists, organising jointly acts of aggression. Some agents have been caught and punished for attempted acts of aggression. In Iasi, 500 Judeo-Communists, who had shot from houses at German and Romanian soldiers, were executed. All further attempts to disturb peace and order will be mercilessly repressed.⁶⁸

It may seem that the only part played by the SSI was to prepare the Iasi massacre. This is, however, untrue, as can be seen in several testimonies, especially the evidence of Colonel Traian Boresecu:

With regard to the massacre: First Operative Echelon was not instructed to kill, but teams were formed by members of the Echelon and did take part in the butchery. A team was led by Grigore Petrovici and Captain Georgehe Balotescu, another by Major Tulbure, another

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 6. 44, testimony of Braunstein.

⁶⁵ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 112.

⁶⁶ Mircu, *Pogromul*, 43.

⁶⁷ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 144; Mircu, *Pogromul*, 45.

⁶⁸ *Universul* (Bucharest), 2 July 1941.

by Georgehe Cristescu Gica, Eugen Cristescu's brother. These teams were under the command of Director Florin Becescu-Georgescu.⁶⁹

During the afternoon of 29 June, the decision was reached to evacuate from Iasi those Jews who had been detained as suspects at the *Chestina*. According to *Chestor* Chirilovici, the order was issued by General Stavrescu, commander of the Fourteenth Division, and by the county prefecture.⁷⁰ The decision was probably made following a meeting that took place on Sunday afternoon, 29 June. The participants were General Stavrescu, a high-ranking German officer, *Chestor* Chirilovici and *Chestor* Leahu, *Chestina* Director Stanculescu, Commissar Anghel and Major Scriban.⁷¹ Approval for the evacuation was sought from the Ministry of the Interior, which granted it over the phone.⁷² The county prefect also spoke on the telephone to Mihai Antonescu, who instructed him to stay in contact with the Ministry of the Interior, which was to evacuate the 'suspects'.⁷³

Approximately 2,500 Jews survived the massacre in the *Chestina* courtyard. Their transportation to the railway station began at 8.00 pm. In charge of this operation were one police inspector, two police officers, two police section chiefs and twenty public guards. The convoy was also escorted by German officers, soldiers in two armoured cars and several motorcyclists.⁷⁴ When they reached the railway station, the prisoners were made to lie face down while being counted, a procedure that took a long time. Two thousand five hundred Jews were herded into freight cars. The largest possible number of prisoners was crammed into each car. The train left Iasi on 30 June 1941, between 3.30 and 4.15 am. At about 4.00 that same morning, a second group of approximately 1,900 Jews to be evacuated were rounded up at the *Chestina*. This group consisted of Jews arrested in the days preceding the pogrom and imprisoned in the basement of the *Chestina*; of the survivors of the butchery in Alea Alecsandri, who had been held captive at the Gendarmerie Headquarters; and of Jews arrested Sunday night or even Monday morning... The escort of this convoy to the station consisted of gendarmes and police led by Assistant Commissioner C. Georgescu and some German soldiers.⁷⁵

Also in the course of Monday morning, 30 June, Sunday's dead and dying were buried together in the Jewish cemetery, in graves that had been dug previously. At 6.00 pm a stonemason called Rotman, an old Jew with a white beard, accompanied by a young man, brought food to the Jews who had been working as grave-diggers

⁶⁹ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 51, testimony of Traian Boresecu. Could the same Florin Becescu-Georgescu be a 'certain Captain Georgescu who commanded a 'Romanian Gestapo' and who together with SS Captain Bart organized the butchery two weeks before it occurred?' *Documents*, 6. 42. Note that this 'Romanian Gestapo' was seen by witnesses on Pacurari Street, where the first incidents took place. One thing is certain, however: the SSI team headed by Grigore Petrovici confirmed that their leader was present at least once in the *Chestina* courtyard on Sunday, 29 June. Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 54–6, testimonies of SSI agents Victor Marinovici, Traian Radulescu and Constantin Petrescu.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 2. 109.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 2. 67.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 2. 118.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 2. 119.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 2. 30–1; *Documents*, 2. 434.

⁷⁵ Carp, *Cartea*, 2. 55, 113–15.

